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19 November 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: Special Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee
on Psychological Warfare**

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Comdr. David Knoll	- Navy Department
Col. Clyde Rich	- Air Force
Col. W. H. Kinard	- Army Department
	- CIA

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2. Mr. Block informed the Subcommittee that after our meeting of yesterday, he met with Messrs. Sargeant and Stone of the Department of State, and they informed him that State had approved the NSC Proposal regarding the conduct of overt psychological warfare. They then asked if the Subcommittee could now stop its work, to which Mr. Block replied in the negative, stating that SANACC must issue the "cease fire" order for the Subcommittee. Then Sargeant and Stone spoke to Saltzman, Chairman of SANACC, whose view was that the Subcommittee cease their deliberations. Following Saltzman's expressed viewpoint, the SANACC staff spoke to Block, Chairman of the Subcommittee, and thus the special meeting was called this afternoon to get the Subcommittee reaction to Mr. Saltzman's position.

3. Rich stated that his mind had been changed since yesterday and he, together with Knoll and Kinard, held the view that because of the Subcommittee responsibilities enumerated in their Charter of operation, plus the fact that the reasons in the paper informally presented by the CIA member were not sufficient, the Subcommittee cannot stop its deliberations, especially not on its own initiative. Knoll went on in bombastic fashion to speak about international tensions and the need for work on the kind of paper we were formulating regarding Emergency Measures.

4. I made the statement that the Subcommittee was acting in very childish fashion and was apparently suffering from the disease of "prerogative-itis"; that we were accomplishing very little at the present time; that there was no compulsion on us to meet any particular number of times each week or month and that, accordingly, it seemed most rational for us to stop "pussy-footing" until a decision was made on the NSC paper which directly affected our existence.

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5. Rich and Knoll stated that such a decision may take months and that, in the meantime, the SANACC Subcommittee, because of its stated responsibilities, would be very vulnerable and, in the event of open hostilities, would be found "holding the bag." Knoll then popped up with the idea that he was working on a paper - a new paper which would point up the problems, the priorities, the complexities, etc., etc., etc., in the overt psychological warfare field. I asked him if such a paper were intended to take precedence over the paper on "Emergency Measures" upon which we had been working. His answer was that the Subcommittee would have to see the new paper first to make such a decision.

6. Then came the piece de resistance of the afternoon. Knoll told the Subcommittee that the NSC paper had not yet been circulated within the Navy. To my inquiry asking why this was so, he replied, "Because Knoll is against it, and the people in the Navy state that when Knoll has 'shot his wad' then, and only then, will they begin circulating the paper throughout the Navy." Of course, until this is done there will probably be no Navy official viewpoint on the proposed NSC paper. Knoll added that last night he gained two to- side strong adherents for his viewpoint. I asked him why he was against the contents of the paper; he replied that it won't work. At this stage of the meeting, I got the firm impression that this dire squabble seemed to involve, to a certain extent, around the stature or future status of one - Commander Knoll.

7. The special meeting concluded by Block stating that he would express the divergent views of the Subcommittee regarding Saltzman's position. On the one side the three Service members were against the cessation of deliberations, and the CIA member favored the idea expressed in the informal paper presented to the Subcommittee at yesterday's meeting.

8. In concluding, I posed an inquiry that if Saltzman wants to call a meeting of SANACC to have SANACC issue a directive to the Subcommittee, such action was definitely within his prerogative. However, Knoll and Rich contended that their members on SANACC would probably not go along with Saltzman.

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